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Abstract 
People do not trust hypocrites, because they preach water, but drink wine. The current 
research shows that, ironically, when we distrust, we become moral hypocrites ourselves. We 
argue that experiencing distrust alerts us to the possibility that others may intent to exploit us, 
and that such looming exploitation differentially affects moral standards for the self versus 
others. Four studies (N = 1,225) examined this possibility and its underlying motivational 
dynamic. Study 1 established a relationship between dispositional distrust and flexible, self-
serving moral cognition. In Studies 2 and 3, participants experiencing distrust (vs. trust) 
endorsed more lenient moral standards for themselves than for others. Study 4 explored the 
role of the motivation to avoid exploitation in these effects. Specifically, participants’ 
dispositional victim sensitivity moderated the effect of distrust on hypocrisy. Together, these 
findings suggest that individuals who distrust and fear to be exploited show self-serving, and 
hence untrustworthy, moral cognition themselves.  
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From international affairs between countries to extramarital affairs in romantic 
relationships, hypocrisy––the endorsement of different moral standards for the self versus 
others––appears to us both prevalent and outrageous (e.g., Laurent, Clark, Walker, & 
Wiseman, 2014). In fact, moral hypocrites are evaluated more negatively, and specifically 
less trustworthy, than liars who straightforwardly claim to behave morally when they do not 
(Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017); by expressing strict moral standards for others, 
moral hypocrites send an implicit, but nevertheless convincing social signal about their own 
moral standards and hence future behavior––without paying the costs of abiding to these 
standards themselves (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). The 
present research suggests that when people experience distrust, they may themselves become 
what they despise—moral hypocrites. In other words, for good reasons, we may distrust other 
hypocrites, but the experience of distrust may turn us into moral hypocrites ourselves: it 
makes us endorse more lenient moral standards for ourselves than for others. If this is the 
case, then distrust and moral hypocrisy may be crucial ingredients to a vicious cycle that 
corrodes interpersonal relationships: distrusting another’s potentially benign intentions 
promotes double moral standards for one’s own and others’ behavior, which will in turn spur 
further distrust and hypocrisy. 
Moral Hypocrisy 
Morality is a fundamental dimension of human social perception and behavior 
(Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). We frequently commit, are targets of, and evaluate moral 
transgressions (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). People use others’ overt 
behavior to draw inferences about their moral character; seemingly harmless behaviors may 
have severe social consequences if observers conclude that these can only be committed by 
someone with a flawed character (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015; see also Rom, 
Weiss, & Conway, 2017). Accordingly, people have a strong need for a moral reputation, and 
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are willing to incur great costs to avoid that negative information about them will be spread 
(Vonasch, Reynolds, Winegard, & Baumeister, 2017). Beyond reputational concerns, people 
have an internal need to regard themselves as moral persons (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Monin 
& Jordan, 2009); in fact, people view moral traits as most essential to the self (Strohminger & 
Nichols, 2014).  
This strong motivation to uphold a moral self-image can give rise to motivated biases 
in people’s moral evaluations (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Klein & Epley, 2017). 
Indeed, people demonstrate a notable flexibility in their moral judgment and oftentimes 
process information in a manner that confirms their preferred conclusions about the morality 
or immorality of certain behaviors (Haidt, 2001; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). 
Consequently, lenient judgments of one’s own moral transgressions while holding others to 
strict moral standards may serve to see the self in a particularly positive light, thus 
maintaining one’s moral self-image. Such double moral standards are hence indicative of 
moral hypocrisy as an inauthentic, self-serving morality (Monin & Merritt, 2012). Earlier 
studies have assessed hypocrisy by revealing inconsistencies between what people claim to 
find moral and their actual behavior (Batson et al., 1997). More recent studies have compared 
people’s moral standards for themselves to the standards they hold other people to (Lammers, 
2012; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2008). In these studies, participants evaluate the moral acceptability of identical 
transgressions either from their own or from another person’s perspective. The resulting 
double moral standards are indicative of not practicing what one preaches to others (Monin & 
Merritt, 2012).  
Importantly, hypocritical moral standards may not only help individuals to deal with 
their past transgressions, but also rationalize future immoral behavior. Specifically, 
generating justifications and mitigating information before committing a potential 
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transgression enables people to behave selfishly and feel moral nevertheless (Shalvi et al., 
2015).  
Conversely, harsh moral judgments of others’ transgressions may prevent immoral 
behaviors committed by others: the expression of moral disapproval can act as a powerful 
deterrent and punishment (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Beyond this social norm-enforcing 
function of moral judgments, strong emotional reactions alert the self, thus preparing oneself 
for and preventing detrimental consequences of others’ transgressions (Haidt, 2003). In sum, 
double moral standards are functional in pursuing one’s self-interest and protecting it from 
others’ behaviors (Monin & Merritt, 2012). Protecting our self-interest, in turn, is particularly 
important when we suspect that others might betray and harm us––when we distrust.  
Distrust and Moral Hypocrisy 
When trusting others, we expect that they will act in our best interest and have good 
intentions. Distrust, on the other hand, alerts us to others’ potentially malevolent intentions. 
Positive expectations of another’s intentions and behavior entail the acceptance of 
vulnerability (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). In contrast, then, doubting another’s 
intentions should entail a state of mind characterized by attempts to minimize vulnerability, 
and an enhanced motivation to avoid exploitation by one’s interaction partners. 
Consequently, when conceiving of the risk that someone might betray their interests, 
individuals should become particularly motivated to protect their own self-interest and to 
restrain their counterpart, thereby counteracting any potential vulnerability (Lewicki, 
McAllister, & Bies, 1998). We therefore contend that the motivation to avoid exploitation 
associated with distrust will affect moral judgments of own versus others’ (potential) 
transgressions in diverging ways, and hence promote moral hypocrisy. Previous research, 
particularly in the domain of social dilemmas, indeed found that distrusting individuals 
behave less cooperatively (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 
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2003). Arguably, individuals who fear to end up as the “sucker” are predominantly focused 
on their self-interest and motivated to behave selfishly in a preemptive manner (Lewicki et 
al., 1998). In consequence, they may search for mitigating information to justify self-
interested transgressions, leading to lenient moral standards for the self.  
At the same time, distrusting individuals may attend to aggravating information or 
applicable moral rules for others, motivated to affirm and enforce moral standards that 
constrain others’ behaviors. In particular, harsh moral judgments of other’s potential immoral 
behaviors may serve to nip their exploitative attempts in the bud, sending a signal to potential 
transgressors. In addition to this social function, as outlined above, moral emotions such as 
anger serve an important alerting and protective function in the face of others’ harmful 
behaviors (Haidt, 2003). Moreover, under distrust, people may question their counterpart’s 
intentions for ambiguous behaviors (Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993). Recent research found 
that people predict themselves to be less capable of and to feel worse after behaving 
immorally, compared to other persons. This self-righteousness effect stems from an 
asymmetrical perception of intentions: people tend to perceive their own intentions as more 
ethical—even when they behave unethically (Klein & Epley, 2017). Importantly, under 
distrust, this tendency should be even increased, promoting hypocrisy in moral judgments of 
transgressions.  
In line with the above reasoning, the few previous empirical investigations of the 
antecedents of moral hypocrisy suggest that it is increased by a motivational focus on one’s 
own interests at the expense of the interests of other parties. For example, social power 
increases double moral standards (Lammers, Stapel & Galinsky, 2010). Power has been 
linked to both a sense of entitlement to rewards (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003) and 
enhanced goal-pursuit (Burgmer & Englich, 2013), and decreased concern for other’s 
perspectives (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). In contrast, hypocrisy is 
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attenuated by feelings of guilt (Polman & Ruttan, 2012)—an affective reaction to having 
harmed another individual, for example by a selfish act.  
Furthermore, the cognitive underpinnings of experiencing distrust may contribute to 
double moral standards. Previous research found that distrust cognitively tunes people to 
consider aspects of situations that may be different than they appear and to entertain 
alternative interpretations (Kleiman, Sher, Elster, & Mayo, 2015; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 
2004; see Mayo, 2015, for an overview). In particular, distrust enhances cognitive flexibility 
and creativity (Mayer & Mussweiler, 2011). Cognitive flexibility, in turn, facilitates self-
serving justifications and hence immoral behaviors such as cheating (Gino & Ariely, 2012). 
An abstract, and hence more flexible thinking style has further been shown to increase moral 
hypocrisy (Lammers, 2012). In sum, a suspicious mind appears well prepared for moral 
hypocrisy already on a basic level of information processing.  
On a motivational level, previous theorizing, and some empirical research particularly 
in the domain of social dilemmas, has invoked the notion of a motivation to avoid 
exploitation (Carpenter & Dolifka, 2017; De Cremer, 1999; Effron & Miller, 2011; 
Yamagishi et al., 2017). It has been argued that individual differences in “sugrophobia,” the 
“fear of being suckered,” reflect affective reactions to being exploited (Vohs, Baumeister, & 
Chin, 2007). Similarly, victim sensitivity describes interindividual differences in reactions to 
being the victim of injustice and hence a motivation to avoid being exploited (Baumert & 
Schmitt, 2016; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Gollwitzer, Süssenbach, & 
Hannuschke, 2015). Victim sensitivity also involves an enhanced sensitivity to 
untrustworthiness cues (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, Pfeifer, & Ensenbach, 2009). According to 
the Sensitivity to Mean Intentions (SeMI) model, such cues readily elicit a “suspicious 
mindset” in highly victim-sensitive individuals, which entails legitimizing cognitions for own 
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immoral behaviors and hostile interpretations of other’s behaviors (Gollwitzer, Rothmund, & 
Süssenbach, 2013).  
Indeed, a number of empirical studies support the hypothesis that when distrust cues 
are present, victim-sensitive individuals show higher levels of uncooperative or selfish 
behavior, arguably in an attempt to protect the self and secure their share (Gollwitzer et al., 
2013). However, whereas most studies have looked at behavioral variables, particularly in 
social dilemmas, only few have assessed victim-sensitive individuals’ evaluations of 
transgressions (Gerlach, Allemand, Agroskin, & Denissen, 2012; Gollwitzer, Schmitt, 
Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005). Yet, if dispositional victim sensitivity amplifies reactions to 
untrustworthiness out of self-protective concerns, it should also exacerbate the hypocrisy-
inducing effects of distrust.  
The Present Research 
The present research investigates how the experience of distrust (vs. trust) shapes the 
propensity for moral hypocrisy. We hypothesize that distrustful individuals will exhibit 
greater leniency for their own compared to other persons’ moral transgressions. This effect 
may be partially driven by distrustful people’s motivation to avoid exploitation by others and 
should thus be moderated by dispositional victim sensitivity. We examined this possibility in 
four studies.1 In Study 1, we explored dispositional associations between social distrust and 
self-serving bending of moral rules (moral flexibility) as an indicator of hypocritical 
tendencies. In Studies 2-4, we experimentally investigated how the experiences of distrust 
(vs. trust) affect the perceived acceptability of various daily-life moral transgressions either 
from participants’ own or third persons’ perspectives. In Study 2, we employed an 
imagination task that manipulated participants’ distrust (trust) in a hypothetical interaction 
                                                        
1 For all studies, we report all relevant measures, all conditions, all data exclusions, and we provide a rationale 
for how sample sizes were determined. Materials for all studies can be found in the Supplementary Online 
Materials (SOM). 
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with a target person. In Study 3, an episodic recall task was used to orthogonally manipulate 
distrust (trust) while measuring moral judgments of various independent scenarios. We 
expected distrusting participants to be more lenient in judging their own transgressive 
behavior versus the behavior of others, even if these others were actually unrelated to the 
source of their distrust. Study 4 explored the role of victim sensitivity, investigating whether 
participants’ dispositional motivation to avoid exploitation would amplify the effect of 
distrust on moral hypocrisy. Specifically, when experiencing distrust, high victim-sensitive 
individuals should be particularly inclined to entertain diverging moral standards for 
themselves versus others. In contrast, low victim-sensitive individuals should be less 
sensitive to such untrustworthiness cues.  
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed as an initial examination of whether distrust is related to 
flexible and self-serving moral judgments. To do so, we followed a correlational approach: 
we used a questionnaire to assess dispositional tendencies to distrust other people 
(Yamagishi, 1988). In addition, participants completed a scale previously used to measure 
moral disengagement and flexibility about moral rules if it serves one’s self-interest as a 
proxy for dispositional moral hypocrisy (Cameron & Payne, 2012; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 
2011). Such self-serving, opportunistic adjustment of moral judgments has previously been 
described as a central characteristic of hypocrisy (Monin & Merritt, 2012). We expected 
participants higher in dispositional distrust to score higher on this moral flexibility scale.  
Method 
Participants and design. Sample size was determined expecting at least r = .20, 
which required a minimum sample of approximately N = 240 to obtain a stable estimate 
(Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). We obtained data from 246 U.S. American adults (148 
males, 98 females, Mage = 34.40, SDage = 11.53) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), 
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who received $0.30. Six additional participants were excluded for failing at an attention-
check item.  
Materials and procedure. Participants filled out a dispositional distrust 
questionnaire consisting of eight items (e.g., “One should not trust others until one knows 
them well;” Yamagishi, 1988) and a six-item scale assessing moral flexibility (Shu et al., 
2011) on scales from 1 (= strongly disagree) to 7 (= strongly agree). The moral flexibility 
scale comprises items that measure the perceived acceptability of moral rule violations if 
these serve one’s interest (e.g., “Rules should be flexible enough to be adapted to different 
situations”). Order of measures was counterbalanced between participants. We averaged both 
scales to indices of dispositional distrust (Cronbach’s α = .87) and moral flexibility (α = .78). 
Following the first measure, participants were prompted to move a slider to a certain scale-
point as an attention-check item. 
Results and Discussion 
Confirming expectations, participants’ dispositional distrust (M = 4.30, SD = 1.07) 
was significantly associated with their moral flexibility (M = 3.39, SD = 1.02), r(246) = .326, 
p < .001, 95% CI [.199, .439].2 Individuals who were more distrusting of other people 
expressed greater acceptance of bending moral rules for self-interested reasons.  
This finding provides initial support for the idea that a distrusting state of mind may 
promote a self-interested shifting of moral standards, which is indicative of moral hypocrisy 
(Monin & Merritt, 2012). Yet, this result is only correlational and therefore does not speak to 
causality. What is more, it remains quite possible that distrustful individuals are simply more 
accepting of moral transgressions in general, irrespective of the agent. However, we reasoned 
that distrusting individuals should be selectively more lenient about their own moral 
                                                        
2 Results of Studies 1 and 4 are based on bootstrapping with 5,000 samples.  
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transgressions, but not others’ immoral behaviors––a dissociative pattern of self- versus 
other-related moral judgments.  
Study 2 
Study 2 employed an experimental design to investigate how experiences of distrust 
(vs. trust) shape moral hypocrisy. Participants experienced distrust (vs. trust) towards an 
imagined target person (a co-worker) and subsequently judged different moral transgressions 
that involved both the participant and the co-worker. These scenarios pitted the self-interest 
of one of them against the other’s interest or a general moral rule or mutual agreement. 
Depending on condition, either the participant or the co-worker were presented as the 
(potential) enactor of the behaviors and target of judgment in these scenarios. We predicted 
that distrustful participants would make more lenient moral judgments for transgressive 
behaviors committed by themselves compared to when committed by their counterpart. For 
participants experiencing trust, such moral hypocrisy should not emerge. 
Method 
Participants and design. We conducted an a priori power analysis with G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Expecting a small-to-medium interaction effect, 
and requiring 80% power, we aimed at collecting approximately N = 270 participants. We 
recruited 271 U.S. American adults (115 males, 156 females, Mage = 34.57, SDage = 12.78) via 
MTurk, who received $0.40. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions 
of a 2 (experience: distrust vs. trust) × 2 (target: self vs. co-worker) between-subjects design. 
In total, eleven additional participants were excluded from analyses because they indicated 
having answered at least one item in a random fashion or purposely wrong (n = 5) or having 
participated multiple times in the same survey (n = 5), or because they could or did not 
provide any sensible response to the imagination task (n = 3). In Studies 2-4, multiple 
exclusion criteria per participant were possible.  
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Materials and procedure. Participants were asked to complete an imagination task. 
First, they were asked to imagine that they had a new job and that they had been assigned to 
work in a team towards a goal of their company. Subsequently, they learned that a new co-
worker also joined the team. In the distrust condition, the co-worker’s past behavior was 
described as unreliable, and participants were told that his or her intentions seemed 
questionable, so that they could not trust that person. Contrary, in the trust condition, this co-
worker’s past behavior was described as conveying reliability and benign intentions so that 
they could trust this person (see SOM). In order to strengthen the effect of the manipulation, 
participants were then asked to write down some of their thoughts about the imagined 
situation (i.e., how they would think, feel, and act).  
Subsequently, participants imagined four additional situations that might happen at 
that workplace. They saw four moral scenarios in a fixed random order that each described a 
situation where either they themselves (self condition) or their co-worker (co-worker 
condition) considered breaking a rule for self-interested reasons. For instance, participants in 
the co-worker condition read that due to time pressure, the co-worker considered to secretly 
delegate an important task to a less qualified intern despite a contrary agreement (see SOM). 
For each of the scenarios, participants rated the degree of acceptability of the described 
behavior on a 7-point scale ranging from not at all acceptable to completely acceptable. We 
averaged ratings across scenarios to form an acceptability index (α = .66) with higher values 
indicating higher moral leniency. Subsequently, participants recalled the imagination task and 
indicated whether they thought they could trust the described co-worker on a 7-point scale 
ranging from not at all to absolutely. This measure served as a manipulation check.  
Results and Discussion 
Our manipulation of distrust (vs. trust) was successful. A 2 (experience: distrust vs. 
trust) × 2 (target: self vs. co-worker) ANOVA on the manipulation-check item confirmed that 
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participants experienced less trust towards the co-worker in the distrust condition (M = 1.43, 
SD = 0.90) compared to the trust condition (M = 6.08, SD = 1.41), F(1, 267) = 1045.42, p < 
.001,  = .797, 90% CI [.764; .821]3. No other effects emerged (Fs ≤ 0.18).  
Consistent with predictions, in the distrust condition, participants who judged moral 
transgressions from their own perspective (M = 2.43, SD = 1.00) judged these more leniently 
compared to participants who imagined their co-worker as the transgressor (M = 1.80, SD = 
0.79), t(267) = 3.82, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.65, 95% CI [0.31; 0.99]. Under distrust, 
participants hence exhibited moral hypocrisy in their judgments (Figure 1). In contrast, in the 
trust condition, moral judgments of the behaviors did not differ as a function of target 
condition (M = 2.15, SD = 0.89, self condition; M = 2.29, SD = 1.11, co-worker condition), 
t(267) = -0.89, p = .375. A 2 (experience: distrust vs. trust) × 2 (target: self vs. co-worker) 
ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 267) = 11.04, p = .001,  = .040, 
90% CI [.010; .084]. In addition, a significant main effect of target emerged, F(1, 267) = 
4.26, p = .040,  = .016, 90% CI [.000; .049]. Moral judgments in the self-condition (M = 
2.29, SD = 0.96) were overall more lenient than in the co-worker condition (M = 2.05, SD = 
0.99), t(269) = 2.02, p = .045, d = 0.25, 95% CI [0.01; 0.48]. There was no main effect of 
experience, F(1, 267) = 0.84, p = .359. 
These findings extend the correlational data of Study 1 in multiple ways. First, they 
indicate that distrust has a causal effect on moral judgment. Second, the effect of distrust on 
moral judgment critically depends on the target of judgment: under distrust, participants gave 
more lenient judgments of the same transgressions when these were presented from their own 
than from their co-workers perspective, whereas under trust, participants judged their own 
and their co-worker’s moral transgressions equally. This indicates that moral judgment is not 
                                                        
3 For one-sided tests (F-tests), 90% confidence intervals are reported (Lakens, 2014; Steiger, 2004).  
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generally less rule-based and more lenient under distrust. Instead, distrusting individuals 
seem to interpret moral rules and situations according to their self-interest, resulting in double 
moral standards.  
Study 2 suggests that individuals who distrust another person show moral hypocrisy 
with respect to this interaction partner. However, previous findings on the antecedents of 
moral hypocrisy, such as social power (Lammers et al., 2010), suggest that the effects of a 
focus on protecting one’s own interest and avoiding exploitation associated with distrust may 
even extend beyond a particular situation and relationship partner. Indeed, distrusting 
individuals may sometimes even react uncooperatively towards targets completely unrelated 
to the previous untrustworthy situation or interaction partner (Rothmund, Gollwitzer, & 
Klimmt, 2011). In addition, the experience of distrust may lead to enhanced attributions of 
malevolent intentions to others. Moreover, on a cognitive level, cues of untrustworthiness 
may elicit a distrust mindset that generalizes to subsequent situations (Mayo, 2015). Hence, 
extending the previous study, we designed Study 3 to examine whether the effect of distrust 
generalizes to moral judgments with respect to persons completely unrelated to the source of 
distrust.  
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Distrust Condition Trust Condition
A
cc
ep
ta
b
il
it
y
 R
at
in
g
s
Self
Co-Worker
DISTRUST PROMOTES MORAL HYPOCRISY 15 
 
Figure 1: Moral judgments as a function of experience and target conditions (Study 2). 
Participants’ mean acceptability ratings of the imagined moral transgressions committed 
either by themselves or committed by a co-worker who had been described as either 
untrustworthy or trustworthy. Higher values indicate higher perceived acceptability (scale 1-
7). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Study 3 
In this study, we used an episodic recall task as manipulation of experiences of 
distrust versus trust (Kleiman et al., 2015). We also designed new moral scenarios that cover 
a wide range of daily-life situations. Accordingly, these scenarios did not involve the same 
social target and context that previously prompted the experience of distrust or trust, thus 
allowing us to test a potential spill-over effect of distrust on moral hypocrisy. We again 
expected a pattern of increased moral hypocrisy under distrust (i.e., greater leniency towards 
own vs. others’ moral transgressions) compared to trust. 
Method 
Participants and design. Based on the effect size obtained in Study 2, the current 
study required a sample size of approximately 200 individuals. Taking into account potential 
exclusions and––due to the predicted spill-over effect––a potentially weaker effect than in 
Study 2, we obtained data from 217 U.S. American adults (89 males, 128 females, Mage = 
34.24, SDage = 13.10) via MTurk, who received $0.45. Another 26 additional participants 
were excluded from analyses because they indicated random or wrong responding (n = 2), did 
not provide a sensible answer to the recall task (n = 2) or failed a manipulation-check item at 
the end of the study prompting them to identify the theme of the recall task (i.e., distrust vs. 
trust; n = 22). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 
(experience: distrust vs. trust) × 2 (target: self vs. other) between-subjects design.  
Materials and procedure. Presented as a task on autobiographical experiences, 
participants in the distrust (trust) condition first wrote about a time in their life when they 
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distrusted (trusted) another person. In both conditions, participants were instructed to recall a 
situation where their distrust (trust) was justified in retrospect. Moreover, they were asked to 
keep the situation in mind because they would later be asked to proceed with this task (see 
SOM; see Kleiman et al., 2015, for a similar procedure).  
Next, as a task on situation perception, participants read six moral scenarios 
structurally similar to those in Study 2 in a fixed random order. These scenarios described 
different daily-life moral transgressions, for example keeping too much change received from 
a cashier or submitting an unjustified warranty claim after accidentally damaging one’s cell 
phone (see SOM). Two scenarios were adapted from previous research (Lammers, 2012; 
Lammers et al., 2010). For each scenario, participants rated how acceptable they would find 
it for themselves (self condition) or another unspecified person (other condition) to engage in 
the described behaviors. We averaged ratings across scenarios to form an acceptability index 
(α = .78).  
Results and Discussion 
Consistent with expectations, in the distrust condition, participants who judged their 
own transgressions (M = 3.55, SD = 1.35) were more lenient than those judging others’ 
transgressions (M = 2.99, SD = 1.44), t(213) = 2.22, p = .028, d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.05; 0.84]. 
Such a pattern of moral hypocrisy did not emerge in the trust condition (M = 3.16, SD = 1.12, 
self condition; M = 3.49, SD = 1.16, other condition), t(213) = -1.42, p = .158 (Figure 2). In 
addition, a 2 (experience: distrust vs. trust) × 2 (target: self vs. other) ANOVA on 
participants’ acceptability ratings revealed the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 213) = 6.70, p 
= .010,  = .031, 90% CI [.004; .077]. No other effects emerged (all Fs ≤ 0.44).  
Study 3 hence replicates the results of Study 2 with a different distrust manipulation 
and a new set of various daily-life scenarios. Ruling out potential demand effects, the current 
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findings indicate that the experience of distrust (vs. trust) promotes moral hypocrisy even 
with respect to transgressions that are unrelated to the incidental source of distrust.  
 
 
Figure 2. Moral judgments as a function of experience and target conditions (Study 3). 
Participants’ mean acceptability ratings of the imagined moral transgressions either 
committed by themselves or committed by another person as a function of distrust (vs. trust). 
Higher values indicate higher perceived acceptability (scale 1-7). Error bars reflect 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
Thus, Studies 1-3 indicate that dispositional, situational, and incidental distrust (vs. 
trust) increase moral flexibility and moral hypocrisy. Study 4 explored a motivational 
dynamic that may contribute to this effect. Specifically, we examined whether dispositional 
victim sensitivity—characterized by a high motivation to avoid exploitation—would 
moderate hypocritical tendencies in response to distrust.  
Study 4 
Study 4 was closely designed after Study 2. We therefore expected to replicate the 
interaction between experiences of distrust and target of moral judgment found in previous 
experiments, such that distrustful (vs. trustful) participants would again show a stronger 
moral hypocrisy effect. In addition, Study 4 investigated whether trait differences in victim 
sensitivity moderate the effect of distrust on moral standards for the self versus others. Based 
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on the assumption that distrusting another person increases the motivation to protect oneself 
from being exploited and to protect one’s self-interest, we predicted that individuals with 
high victim sensitivity––that is, strong dispositional self-protective concerns (Schmitt et al., 
2005)––would show stronger hypocrisy under conditions of distrust. 
Method  
Study 4 comprised two different data collection phases on MTurk. In the intake 
survey, we invited a large number of participants to complete a short personality survey 
including a measure of trait victim sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2005). These participants were 
later invited to participate in the main study, which closely followed the design and procedure 
of Study 2. Participants completed the main study between approximately one to five weeks 
after the intake survey. This temporal dissociation between measurements of victim 
sensitivity as dispositional moderator and moral judgments as focal outcome variable 
provided a particularly strong test of our moderation hypothesis, preventing potential demand 
effects. 
Participants and design. A total of 900 participants completed a short personality 
survey, and received $0.30 as compensation. At the end of the survey, participants were 
asked to provide their MTurk Worker-ID, a unique account identifier, if they agreed to be 
invited to a subsequent study. The main study was framed as a study on situation perception 
and accessible to all participants who had indicated their Worker-ID at the end of the intake 
survey. Participants received $0.45 upon completion. We aimed at collecting a minimum 
sample of n = 100 participants per between condition. However, anticipating a considerable 
drop out, we allowed all participants from the intake survey to participate in the main study. 
Data from six participants in the main study could not be matched with the data set from the 
intake survey. Furthermore, some participants who provided data to both the intake survey 
and main study were excluded from analyses because they indicated to have participated 
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multiple times in the intake survey (n = 4) or in the main study (n = 10), or admitted to 
random or purposefully wrong responding in the intake survey (n = 6) or the main study (n = 
2). Exclusions were also based on a failed attention check in the main study (n = 14) or on 
not providing meaningful text input for the imagination task (n = 1). In addition, due to 
technical difficulties, some participants (n = 14) were able to participate in the main study 
twice with their identical account in two different MTurk batches, so that the second data set 
provided by the respective participant was excluded from analyses. Taking into account these 
exclusions, we obtained complete data from 491 participants (257 females, 232 males, 2 
other, Mage = 36.97, SDage = 11.92).  
Materials and procedure. In the intake survey, participants completed the short 
version of the victim sensitivity scale (Schmitt et al., 2005). Sample items are “I ruminate for 
a long time when other people are treated better than me” or “I cannot easily bear it when 
others profit unilaterally from me”. Participants rated their agreement with ten statements on 
six-point scales (1 = not at all; 6 = exactly; M = 3.94, SD = 1.09. α = .92).4  
For the main study, we slightly adjusted the four scenarios from Study 2 in order to 
reduce a potential floor effect (see SOM). Specifically, in order to increase the moral wiggle 
room in the scenarios, the target’s incentives and/or justifications for the immoral behavior in 
question were stressed more. In addition, we extended the moral judgment measure from one 
to four items per scenario and had participants indicate their judgments on nine-point scales 
(1 = not at all, 9 = absolutely). For example, the four items for the scenario “delegation” in 
the self condition read “I would probably have good reasons to delegate the report to the 
intern”, “It would reflect poorly on me if I delegated the report to the intern” (reversed), “The 
circumstances would justify that I delegate the report to the intern”, and “It would be a 
                                                        
4 We also assessed and controlled for participants’ justice sensitivity from an observer’s perspective (see SOM). 
Subsequently, participants completed personality measures not relevant to the present studies.  
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questionable choice on my part if I delegated the report to the intern” (reversed). Mean 
ratings again reflected more lenient moral judgments (α = .66).  
Results and Discussion 
Effect of distrust on moral hypocrisy. We first submitted the data from the main 
study to a 2 (experience: distrust vs. trust) × 2 (target: self vs. co-worker) ANOVA. 
Consistent with expectations and replicating the results of Studies 2 and 3, in the distrust 
condition, participants who judged their own transgressions (M = 3.77, SD = 1.26) exhibited 
greater leniency compared to those who judged their co-worker’s transgressions (M = 2.70, 
SD = 1.09), t(487) = 6.83, p < .001, d = 0.86, 95% CI [0.61; 1.12]. In contrast, participants 
who experienced trust judged transgressions in the self condition less leniently than in the co-
worker condition, thus showing the reversed pattern (M = 3.36, SD = 1.29, self condition; M 
= 3.74, SD = 1.30, co-worker condition), t(487) = -2.39, p = .017, d = -0.31, 95% CI [-0.56; -
0.05]. Accordingly, participants’ moral judgments revealed the predicted interaction effect, 
F(1, 487) = 42.09, p < .001,  = .080, 90% CI [.045; .120]. Significant main effects of 
experience, F(1, 487) = 8.11, p = .005,  = .016, 90% CI [.003; .040], and target, F(1, 487) 
= 9.47, p = .002,  = .019, 90% CI [.004; .044], emerged as well. Participants were overall 
more lenient in the self (M = 3.57, SD = 1.29) than in the co-worker (M = 3.22, SD = 1.30) 
condition, t(489) = 3.01, p = .003, d = 0.27, 95% CI [0.09; 0.45]. They also gave less lenient 
moral judgments under distrust (M = 3.24, SD = 1.29) compared to trust (M = 3.56, SD = 
1.30), t(489) = -2.71, p = .007, d = -0.24, 95% CI [-0.42; -0.07].  
Victim sensitivity as moderator. Subsequently, moral judgments were regressed on 
target (0 = self, 1 = co-worker), experience (0 = trust, 1 = distrust), victim sensitivity, and 
their interaction terms. The predicted three-way interaction between target, experience, and 
victim sensitivity was significant, b = -0.516, SE = 0.203, t(483) = -2.54, p = .011, 95% CI [-
2
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0.915; -0.116], confirming that victim sensitivity moderated the effect of distrust on moral 
hypocrisy (for complete regression results, see SOM).  
Specifically, in the distrust condition (Fig. 3, left panel), a significant target × victim 
sensitivity interaction emerged, b = -0.489, SE = 0.137, t(483) = -3.56, p < .001, 95% CI [-
0.759; -0.219]. In line with predictions, when experiencing distrust, participants’ moral 
hypocrisy inclination was affected by their dispositional victim sensitivity. Analyses revealed 
that participants’ victim sensitivity predicted greater leniency for moral judgments of their 
own transgressions, b = 0.316, SE = 0.098, t(483) = 3.24, p = .001, 95% CI [0.124; 0.507]. In 
contrast, there was a marginally significant effect of victim sensitivity in the opposite 
direction on judgments of the co-worker’s transgressions, b = -0.173, SE = 0.097, t(483)  = -
1.79, p = .074, 95% CI [-0.364; 0.017]. In other words, moral standards for themselves versus 
their co-worker diverged more strongly under distrust for participants with higher, compared 
to lower, levels of dispositional victim sensitivity.  
In contrast, in the trust condition (Fig. 3, right panel), the target × victim sensitivity 
interaction was non-significant, b = 0.027, SE = 0.150, t(483) = 0.18, p = .857, 95% CI [-
0.267; 0.321]. Higher victim sensitivity scores were associated, albeit non-significantly, with 
more lenient moral judgments for both the self, b = 0.158, SE = 0.105, t(483) = 1.51, p = 
.131, 95% CI [-0.047; 0.363], and the co-worker, b = 0.185 SE = 0.107, t(483) = 1.72, p = 
.085, 95% CI [-0.026; 0.396]. These results remain highly similar when justice sensitivity 
from an observers’ perspective is included as a covariate (see SOM).  
These results are in line with the notion that the motivation to avoid exploitation and 
to protect specifically one’s self-interest contributes to the link between distrust and moral 
hypocrisy. When distrusting another person, participants exhibited double moral standards, 
and became more lenient with themselves than they were with their interaction partner. 
However, this hypocritical judgment tendency was particularly pronounced among high 
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victim-sensitive participants, that is, individuals who are highly motivated to avoid 
exploitation. In contrast, when trusting another person, victim sensitivity did not predict 
moral hypocrisy. In line with our reasoning, these findings suggest that people may utilize 
hypocritical moral judgments to counteract the threat of exploitation when perceiving the 
need to protect themselves under conditions of distrust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Moral judgments as a function of target condition and victim sensitivity in the 
distrust (left panel) and trust (right panel) conditions (Study 4). Participants’ mean moral 
judgments of the imagined moral transgressions either committed by themselves or 
committed by their co-worker at ±1 standard deviation of victim sensitivity in the distrust 
(left panel) and trust (right panel) conditions. Higher values indicate more lenient moral 
judgments (scale 1-9). 
 
General Discussion 
The present studies indicate that trust and distrust differentially affect flexible and 
self-serving moral judgments. Whereas individuals in a trustful state of mind appear to judge 
moral transgressions as more or less equally acceptable regardless of whether these are 
committed by themselves or another person, individuals experiencing distrust exhibit moral 
hypocrisy. They judge identical transgressions less harshly when committed by themselves 
rather than another individual. As an initial examination of our hypotheses, Study 1 employed 
a correlational design, showing that dispositional distrust is related to a flexible and self-
serving rather than an absolute interpretation of moral rules. Distrustful individuals more 
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strongly supported bending moral rules when it served their self-interest. Studies 2 and 3 
provided experimental support for our hypotheses, applying different techniques to induce 
the experiences of distrust versus trust, that is, an imagination task and a recall task. In 
addition, different sets of daily-life moral transgressions were used to assess moral judgments 
in these experiments. Study 3 additionally revealed that distrust can increase moral hypocrisy 
even for targets of judgment who are not related to the initial source of distrust. Study 4 
replicated the findings from Studies 2 and 3. More importantly, it examined the role of the 
motivation to protect oneself from exploitation. We found that dispositional differences in 
victim sensitivity assessed in a separate survey moderated the effect of distrust on moral 
hypocrisy assessed weeks later. Individuals who are highly sensitive to being the victim of 
injustice reacted most strongly to a target’s untrustworthiness versus trustworthiness. 
Importantly, under distrust, but not trust, victim sensitivity predicted judgments of one’s own 
and another’s moral transgressions in opposite directions. Taken together, distrust promotes 
moral hypocrisy particularly when people are motivated to avoid exploitation and protect 
their self-interest.  
Methodological Contributions and Limitations 
On a methodological level, the present research contributes to research on both trust 
and distrust and moral judgment. Specifically, we developed a new experimental 
manipulation to induce the experiences of trust and distrust (Studies 2 & 4). Further, the few 
previous experimental investigations of hypocrisy mostly relied on single scenarios. Here, we 
developed new scenario batteries covering various daily-life situations, hence providing a 
statistically more powerful measure of moral hypocrisy. In line with previous research 
(Lammers et al., 2010), we operationalized moral hypocrisy between subjects. Conceivably, 
within-subjects designs might disclose the research question to participants. Such direct 
comparisons between moral transgressions from one’s own and others’ perspectives could 
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thus restrain motivated moral reasoning, because people value consistency and fairness, and 
believe in the objectivity of their moral positions (Epley & Caruso, 2004; Graham, Nosek, 
Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011). In other words, rendering self-other differences salient to 
participants in a within-subjects design might threaten their moral self-image. In addition, as 
noted above, appearing as a hypocrite is socially risky (Jordan et al., 2017). Within-subjects 
designs with greater temporal delay between self and other judgments, however, could 
provide an avenue for future research in this respect.  
More generally, the present research solely relied on hypothetical scenarios, in line 
with most previous hypocrisy research. However, previous research revealed a potential 
disconnect between people’s reactions to hypothetical as opposed to actual transgressions. 
For example, people may anticipate considerably stronger affective responses to racist acts 
(targeted at a member of a different ethnic group) compared to their actual affective and 
behavioral responses (Kawakami, Dunn, Karmali, & Dovidio, 2009). Similarly, judgments of 
others’ actual behavior may be more strongly biased by whether and how it affects observers’ 
own self-interest compared to judgments of merely imagined transgressions (Bocian & 
Wojciszke, 2014). Not only people’s actual moral evaluations, but also their subsequent 
behaviors may be affected by various factors, including the avoidance of potential costs and 
risks (e.g., being punished). Hypocritical moral judgments may thus not directly translate into 
behavior. Nevertheless, previous studies in the domain of moral hypocrisy have found 
convergence between moral judgment and behavior, and hypocritical moral standards with 
respect to actual transgressions. For example, one study found that power increased actual 
cheating behavior in accordance with its effects on leniency in self-related moral judgments 
(Lammers et al., 2010, Study 1). Valdesolo and DeSteno (2008) compared judgments of 
participants’ own actual selfish behavior in the laboratory to judgments of another 
participant’s ostensible selfishness, exposing moral hypocrisy. The current limitations 
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notwithstanding, these previous findings may thus suggest that the motivational dynamics 
involved in the present research can translate to moral reactions in real-life situations. In 
addition, as moral judgments can serve as justifications for future behavior (Shalvi et al., 
2015), hypocritical standards should affect the actual tendency to break rules, and to punish 
such behaviors in others. 
Another limitation of the present research is that it focused on interpersonal 
relationships, looking at individual persons as both sources of distrust and agents of 
transgressions. Future research might thus investigate how the present findings translate to 
intergroup contexts. Findings that in an intergroup conflict, group members may focus more 
strongly on moral values of loyalty compared to fairness or harm, exemplify how group 
membership affects the biased justification of transgressions (Leidner & Castano, 2012). 
Interestingly, victim sensitivity can contribute to exploitative interpretations of intergroup 
relations (Süssenbach & Gollwitzer, 2015), and might hence as well influence double 
standards in intergroup conflicts. We also focused on evaluations of immoral behaviors. Even 
though hypocrisy has been found for prosocial behaviors as well (Polman & Ruttan, 2012), 
we speculate that distrust predominantly affects moral standards for transgressions: there is a 
generally greater self-other dissociation in the immoral domain which is based on 
asymmetrical perceptions of intentions that distrust, in turn, should amplify (Gollwitzer et al., 
2013; Klein & Epley, 2017).  
Further, the present results were exclusively obtained with U.S. American samples on 
MTurk. This potential limitation notwithstanding, compared to typical student samples, 
MTurk samples are slightly more diverse (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and more 
attentive (Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). To ensure sufficient attentiveness and hence data 
quality, we required a 95% approval rate for our participants (Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 
2014), above and beyond attention and manipulation checks. Nevertheless, an investigation 
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of the current hypotheses particularly in a population from a different cultural background 
could provide a valuable addition to the present set of studies.  
Theoretical Contributions 
The present findings extend the literature on moral hypocrisy, demonstrating how 
distrust can make moral cognition more flexible. Even though double moral standards may 
have highly detrimental consequences for interpersonal relationships and societies, only little 
research to date has addressed its antecedents. Notably, previous research has largely focused 
on the effects of approach-oriented variables on hypocrisy, such as social power and anger 
(Lammers et al., 2010; Polman & Ruttan, 2012). The present research is hence the first to 
investigate how a prevention-focused state of mind such as the experience of distrust affects 
moral standards for the self and others in differential ways. 
 In line with this perspective, distrust (vs. trust) overall appeared to have a stronger 
effect on judgments of others’ transgressions, compared to judgments of one’s own 
transgressions. As argued above, both lenient standards for the self and strict moral standards 
for others can serve to protect one’s self-interest from exploitation (Gollwitzer et al., 2013). 
Indeed, previous research has attributed defective behavior and cheating not only to greed or 
a temptation by rewards, but also to the avoidance of exploitation or even regret (DeCremer, 
1999; Effron & Miller, 2011)—which may then be rationalized in order to maintain a moral 
self-image. However, the present studies suggest that distrusting individuals may focus more 
strongly on preventing others’ transgressions than achieving a competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, in a prevention orientation, individuals should focus more strongly on the 
potentially negative consequences of their own transgressions, such as punishment or 
reputational hazard, counteracting leniency for the self. Consequently, the processes 
underlying distrustful individuals’ hypocrisy may differ from the reward motivation and 
entitlement that arguably drive the effect of power on hypocrisy (Lammers et al., 2010).  
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This perspective is in line with the moderating role of interindividual differences,  
which supports the notion that self-protective concerns, rather than increased entitlement or a 
general concern for justice and reciprocity, underlie the effect of distrust on moral standards. 
Specifically, we found that the dispositional need to avoid exploitation amplified the effect of 
a target’s untrustworthiness on hypocrisy. Earlier research has contrasted victim sensitivity‘s 
positive association with self-reported transgressions to its positive association with 
judgments of moral wrongness of the same behavior (Gollwitzer et al., 2005, Study 3). The 
present research extends these findings, specifying distrust as a situational condition under 
which victim-sensitive individuals may tend towards a self-serving morality. In addition, 
comparing moral judgments of identical behaviors committed by the self versus others 
provides novel and more direct evidence for victim-sensitive individuals’ hypocritical moral 
standards. As the latter may serve as justifications for subsequent behavior, the present work 
complements previous findings on the role of rationalization in the effects of victim 
sensitivity in close relationships (Gerlach et al., 2012): victim-sensitive individuals’ lower 
forgiveness of close others’ transgressions is associated both with mistrustful interpretations 
and with legitimizing cognitions regarding their own self-protective and unrelenting 
reactions. The present approach also extends research focusing on participants’ own 
behaviors (e.g., Rothmund et al., 2011). It thus integrates previous research on the 
dispositional motivation to avoid exploitation with the effects of trust and distrust 
experiences, thereby providing additional empirical evidence for the SeMI Model (Gollwitzer 
et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the present findings tie in with accounts from the moral licensing 
domain: a trusted target may have accumulated enough moral “credit” to have some leeway 
for immoral behavior (Miller & Effron, 2010). Similarly, following a moral credentials 
account, a distrusted target may have less “moral credentials,” leading to less favorable 
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interpretations of ambiguous behaviors (Miller & Effron, 2010). While these arguments are 
less applicable to the carry-over effect in Study 3, expecting generally malevolent behavior 
from other persons may induce perceived license to transgress in distrusting individuals. 
Moreover, the risk of being the “sucker” should threaten people’s sense of competence (Vohs 
et al., 2007), which, in turn, can motivate self-enhancement in the moral domain (the “sucker-
to-saint effect”, Jordan & Monin, 2008). Plausibly, in order to deal with this threat to their 
agency, people may reframe their own transgressions as moral, or view others’ as more 
distinct and immoral.  
Interestingly, in the trust conditions of Study 4, participants were stricter with 
themselves than with another person, a phenomenon that has been coined hypercrisy 
(Lammers et al., 2010). Under trust, a reduced subjective need to protect one’s self-interest 
and an enhanced concern for another’s interests may promote leniency towards that target. 
Likewise, reduced entitlement and enhanced reputational concerns, or the risk of harming the 
relationship may attenuate the tendency to rationalize own transgressions. Hence, such 
reversed double standards may not just be a methodological artefact. Rather, the antecedents 
of hypercrisy, including relationship characteristics such as trust, deserve further 
investigation. Overall, however, the tendency for hypocrisy under distrust appeared to be 
stronger in the present data—potentially due to a general tendency for self-serving moral 
judgments (see Lammers et al., 2010, for a similar argument), and our focus on non-personal 
relationships.  
More generally, the present research investigates the social-cognitive consequences of 
distrust in an inherently social domain, extending them to self-evaluations, and thereby 
contributing to existing work that largely focused on the cognitive characteristics of a distrust 
mindset or judgments about others (Kleiman et al., 2015; Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). Our 
findings also tie in with previous studies showing that subtle cues of distrust can increase 
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cognitive flexibility, suggesting that distrust may as well affect flexibility of moral cognition. 
Indeed, flexible cognition may contribute to the present findings (Gino & Ariely, 2012); 
plausibly, distrustful individuals are better able to spontaneously entertain multiple, 
alternative interpretations of moral situations and rules which helps them to flexibly focus on 
those aspects that support their preferred moral judgment (see Friesen & &Sinclair, 2011; 
Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996). In fact, recent research indicates that distrust can increase 
both utilitarian and deontological tendencies in moral dilemma judgments––suggesting more 
flexible and less one-sided moral cognition under distrust (Conway, Weiss, Burgmer, & 
Mussweiler, 2018). Lastly, experimental research on the social-motivational consequences of 
distrust is rare thus far. The current research documents the motivation to avoid exploitation 
as an important motivational moderator of the effects of distrust and thus complements recent 
findings indicating that distrust increases the motivation for control and predictability 
(Burgmer & Weiss, 2018). Conceivably, attempts to gain control and predictability over a 
situation may affect moral standards for the self and others (see also Lammers et al., 2010).  
Importantly, hypocritical moral standards under distrust can affect behavior, 
promoting unscrupulous selfishness and harsh reactions to others’ transgressions, for instance 
direct punishment or gossip that undermines the target’s reputation. The present research 
hence provides insight into the psychological processes underlying previous findings that 
distrust leads to uncooperative behavior in social dilemmas such as public goods dilemmas 
(DeCremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith, 2003). Furthermore, 
complementing an investigation of incidental distrust with distrust integral to a specific target 
and relationship, it elucidates how distrust may corrode interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships: once transgressions are not measured on the same scale anymore, and distrust 
increases further, conflicts become more difficult to reconcile. Moral hypocrisy may hence be 
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an integral component of downward spirals of distrust and uncooperative behavior (Crocker 
& Canevello, 2015; Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2008).  
Conclusion 
Hypocrites do not practice what they preach, but send false signals about their own 
morality. Consequently, they evoke moral outrage and spark distrust (Jordan et al., 2017; 
Monin & Merrit, 2012). It is not without a sense of irony, then, that people who are 
distrustful of others’ intentions may assume double moral standards in order to protect 
themselves, evaluating their own immoral behaviors more leniently than those of other 
persons. In this way, the present findings suggest that distrust can promote a dynamic that 
corrodes interpersonal relationships—with distrust provoking further hypocrisy, fueling 
deeper distrust among interaction partners. 
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